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To: Chief of Naval Operations (Office of Naval
Intelligence).

Via: (1) The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
(2) The Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps.
(3) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
(4) Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS),
Comments and recommendations thereon.

1.Various strong points and deficiencies were noted while using JANIS in the development of intelligence regarding either the target area or the enemy strategic area supporting the target area or both for ...[several]... operational plans. ...

2. JANIS publications have provided basic intelligence requirements, especially in the planning stages. This point was noted particularly in the preparation for the BLACKLIST operation, and the following comments are thought to be of interest:

b. In preparing for the BLACKLIST operation, the available intelligence material, the majority of which was obtained from CINCPAC Forward Echelon and from the Twenty-First Bomber Command, consisted of "JANIS No. 84"; "Strategic Engineer Study No. 125"; ONI Port Studies on NAGASAKI, SASEBO, KOKURA, and MOJI-SHIMONOSEKI; inadequate photo coverage; and some U.S. Army Air Corps Target Folders. Of these sources JANIS No. 84 provided the basic intelligence and the other sources, in effect, supplemented JANIS No. 84.

c.if the original date of the landing had been carried out, this division would not have received the following publications in time: "CINCPAC-CINCPOA Intelligence Bulletin No. 132-45" of 28 August 1945 and "Allied Geographical Section, SWPA, Terrain Study", published the first week in September; both publications covered the northern Kyushu area. JANIS No. 84 would have provided the required minimum of intelligence information; the other available intelligence material, excluding JANIS No. 84, would not have provided sufficient intelligence information.

3. The major categories of material that were not obtained from JANIS, due to their receipt by Allied Intelligence Agencies after JANIS was compiled and published, are: (1) information derived from subsequent aerial photographs, (2) subsequent order of battle information, and (3) subsequent information derived from prisoners of war interrogations and translations of captured documents, including maps and charts. This material was usually provided by ATIS and JICPOA, as individual items or in timely compilations of intelligence by area or subject matter which in many cases also used basic JANIS material as the framework in which to include the new material.

4. Had JANIS included the information listed below, it would have been a more complete basic source of intelligence information:

- a. Additional information of enemy installations.
- b. Bomb damage assessment.
- c. Evaluation of port, harbor, railroad facilities, and exits therefrom in a manner that would indicate the ability to unload and move an estimated amount of personnel and/or materiel per hour or per day. (This procedure has been partially developed in the 1945 ONI Port Studies.)
- d. A comprehensive terrain study of limited, important areas, especially the key cities, ports and communication routes, which would provide adequate reference for a landing force in the event that they are engaged in the occupation of said areas; studies of critical areas should insure essential coverage, when possible, by:

(1) Aerial photographs - such could be printed in the appropriate chapters or mosaics could be printed as photo maps on separate sheets or on the reverse side of appropriate maps and be included in the supplement; in

time of peace aerial photographs are frequently printed in the photogravure sections of newspapers, in magazines, books and other publications, which, if collected, would provide adequate material for at least good sketches of the area in question; in time of peace such photographs are often available from film news companies, and other similar commercial sources.

(2) Hydrographic charts - such are essential to both an amphibious landing and logistic resupply; a constant aggressive procurement of such of all areas by the Hydrographic Office via our Naval Attaches should become standardized as policy; during the author's duty in Departmental Intelligence, it was found that many ports frequently prepared up to date hydrographic charts of the port area, usually in blueprint form, for their local use whereas the national hydrographic office only infrequently printed corrected editions and that the former were frequently obtained by requests of Captains of our Merchant Marine and warships and local shipping company representatives.

(3) Maps, all types - such are essential to both amphibious landings and air borne operations because the topography and works of man are basic factors that must be considered in developing the concept of an operation and subsequent, detailed operation orders; such should be aggressively obtained from all sources of all areas in time of peace in order to provide a maximum of available material for possible use.

(4) City plans - such are essential in occupation operations for one of the most difficult operations is to rapidly and efficiently seize control of essential buildings and installations. An operation plan for the

Subjects of great importance are: government buildings, utilities, factories, laboratories, billeting facilities, communication facilities, military installations, best routes to and from said installations, key terrain features, key installations such as bridges, tunnels, etc. Such plans can readily be obtained during time of peace in a large majority of cases by purchases on the open market and by obtaining such as are made available in various publications.

(5) Annotated Ground Photographs - such are of great importance in that an annotated picture will reveal more desired information than many pages of descriptive writing. Subjects of importance are generally the same as those listed in paragraph 4 d (3) above. In preparing for the BLACKLIST operation, there was a strong desire that JANIS #84 should have contained several hundred annotated, ground photographs of the cities under consideration. It is therefore recommended that additional subject pictures either be included in the body of the chapters or be included in a special booklet enclosed in the supplement and their coverage should be annotated on and cross indexed in the body of JANIS and on the charts, maps and city plans. When possible each picture should have attached thereto such data as the focal length of the lens, the hour and date taken, the direction of shot, subject photographed, etc., for such data will enable photographic interpreters to develop many details of value when required. Such photographs should be methodically collected during time of peace for they are no longer available once hostilities commence except from neutral travelers departing from the country in question or the procurement of the old photographs accumulated by the many American tourists and

5. JANIS has now become an essential type of publication that should be maintained in times of peace and constantly improved as to quality, accuracy, completeness of coverage, scope, usability, and timeliness of the information contained therein for the following reasons:

a. Our experience in this war has effectively proved that if the United States is to have the necessary, basic intelligence available for early planning of possible operations, it is essential that such intelligence must be collected, collated, published, and distributed, i. e., ready to use, prior to the beginning of hostilities. The technological developments of the world vitally affect military agencies in, first, the reduction of the time and space factor in enemy or unfriendly nations' capabilities of attacking our military and semi-military installations, and, second, the ever increasing quantity of new military technological developments, including the technique of their use. Due to these essential factors, intelligence must receive an ever increasing emphasis, especially as to timeliness, because military plans can only be as sound as the intelligence upon which they are based.

b. Our present evolutionary state of foreign policy whereby the United States will possibly assume international police powers indicates the probability that the United States will assume an unprecedented amount of treaty obligations that will remain effective directly in proportion to the ability of our armed forces to enforce such obligations. In view of this probable international employment, adequate intelligence must be readily available to units which will be required to fulfill such assigned missions. JANIS is the only present publication that could be the basic source for such intelligence information.